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STATEMENT OF TURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78A-4-103(2) (j) and transfer by the Supreme Court.
REFERENCES TO PARTIES
Appellants Evergreen Development and Anderson Development, L.C. have
withdrawn from this appeal, and Appellants Milton O. Bitner Company, Ella M.
Pace, Dwayne M. Pace, trustee of the Dwayne M. Pace Revocable Trust, Joan J.
Pace, trustee of the Joan J. Pace Revocable Trust, Gale W. Pace and Kathleen D.
Pace have not filed briefs and are now unrepresented. Appellant Nadine Gillmor,
individually and as trustee of the Nadine Fausett Gillmor Trust ("Gillmor" herein),
remains and continues to assert the theories propounded by the consolidated
complaints. Appellees Summit County, et aL will be referred to collectively as the
"County.55
RESTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the district court correctly held that Gillmor's facial challenges

to the County's land use and development ordinances enacted in 1998 were timebarred, both by the 30-day limitations period in Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001
(1998) 1 and by the four-year limitation of § 78-12-25(3) (1998).2
Standard of Review: Application of these statutes of limitations to bar an
action presents a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. Tolman v.
Logan City, 2007 UT App 260,1110, 167 P.3d 489, 492.

'Currently § 17-27a-801.
'Currently § 78B-2-307(3).
1
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Preservation: The limitations issue was raised and preserved by the County's
Memorandum in Support of Defendants5 Motion for Summary Judgment. R. pp.
209-215.
2.

Whether the district court correctly held on summary judgment that the

County's decisions to deny appKcations Gillmor submitted seeking either to amend
the existing land use ordinances, or to develop as if the ordinances did not exist,
were not arbitrary, capricious or illegal because the applications did not comply with
the existing land use and development ordinances of the County.
Standard of Review: Summary judgment presents a question of law which is
reviewed for correctness. Tolman, supra, II 7. However, when reviewing county
land use decisions, K[t]he courts shall: (a) presume that land use decisions and
regulations are valid; and (b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary,
capricious, or illegal." Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001(3) (current version at Utah
Code Ann. § 17-27a-801(3) (a) (2007)). A county's decision whether or not to
amend existing zoning ordinances is not arbitrary or capricious if it is "reasonably
debatable.33 Id. See also Tolman, supra, 1114.
Preservation: This issue was preserved by the County's Memorandum in
Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment (R. pp. 215-221), and by its reply
memorandum. R. pp. 753-754.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES.
ORDINANCES OR RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27a-801(2) (a) (2007):
Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the
exercise of or in violation of the provisions of this chapter
may file a petition for review of the decision with the
district court within 30 days after the local decision is
rendered.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-307(3) (2008):
2
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An action may be brought within four years:
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law.
STATEMENT OP THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

Gillmofs prolix pleadings, styled as Complaints/Petitions for Review,
technically have two separate components and can best be analyzed accordingly.
First, in major part the pleadings consist of a facial attack on the County's 1997
General Plan ("1997 Plan55) and 1998 Development Code ("1998 Code"), and seek
to have all the County's land use and development ordinances declared void, invalid
and of no effect whatsoever. Amended CompL/Pet, R. pp. 59-124.3
The district court found this component of Gillmor's action to be untimely,
and barred by express limitations provisions. The district court held that Gillmor5s
facial challenges brought some seven years after adoption of the ordinances, and after
Gillmor had been party to a subsequentiy dismissed action brought in 1998 that
made similar assertions and expressly sought a ruling that the 1997 Plan and 1998
Code were "void ab initio,55 were simply too late to be judicially cognizable under
any of the legal theories Gillmor asserted in the pleadings.
Gilimor's pleadings also describe: 1) applications which requested the County
to amend the applicable general plan and development ordinances in order to allow
development that was otherwise not consistent with the existing plan and code, and
which were ultimately denied by the County after a public process; and 2) a certain

3

The complaints assert more than 20 separate legal theories characterized as
"claims for relief3 and the "cumulative effect of the illegalities." Based on these,
Gillmor sought to have the district court invalidate the County's entire zoning
scheme then in effect, and requested that the district court retain continuing
jurisdiction over the County's land use planning processes to hire new staffand
substitute its judgment for that of the local elected officials. See, e.g.. Amended
Compl./Pet., R. pp. 64-65.
3
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plat application (the "Plat Application") Giilmor submitted based upon her unilateral
determination the 1997 Plan and 1998 Code were illegal and unenforceable by the
County, and that her properties were therefor ccun~zoned."
Because Gillmor's pleadings could be read as a timely Petition for Review of
the County's decisions to deny these applications, the district court could review
such decisions in light of the then existing ordinances. On such review, however, it
is clear that the County's decisions on these particular applications was not arbitrary,
capricious or illegal as a matter of law because the applications made no attempt to
comply with the long-standing and generally applicable ordinances. In fact, the
applications themselves could be viewed as simply part and parcel of Gillmor's facial
attack on the ordinances validity in the first instance.
Thus while many if not most of the underlying factual allegations and related
legal theories relating to the validity of the challenged ordinances are disputed, the
district court's review of this matter focused on two primarily legal issues:
(1) whether Gillmor's challenges based on the alleged facial "illegalities" of the
existing development ordinances were time-barred; and (2) assuming the legality of
the ordinances themselves, whether there was anything arbitrary, capricious or illegal
about the decisions to deny Gillmor's development applications
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

This matter began as two cases which advanced nearly identical claims and
sought identical relief On the County's motion the two cases were consolidated,
and have been treated as essentially one action. As set forth above, the Evergreen
Development and Anderson Development, L.C. parties have since withdrawn from
this appeal. Giilmor is a plaintiff in both cases and continues to assert her theories
here.

4
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Sometime after consolidation of the cases, the County moved for summary
judgment on Gillmor's claims. R. p. 152. In doing so, the County compiled and
submitted the record of the legislative proceedings involved in adopting the 1997
Plan and 1998 Development Code, as well as the record of proceedings before the
Snyderville Basin Planning Commission ("SBPC") and the Board of County
Commissioners ("BCC") wherein those bodies considered Gillmor's applications to
amend the applicable ordinances in order to allow her proposed development,
R. pp. 182-208.
Subsequent to the County's motion, Gillmor filed her own Motion for
Summary Judgment on the merits of her facial challenges to the development
ordinances, supported by her own selected portions of the record of proceedings and
other documents. R. pp. 245; 231-39. Because the County's motion was
potentially dispositive and could obviate the need for ruling on the merits of
Gillmor's claims, the County moved pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 16 to suspend
briefing on Gillmor's motion until after a decision on the County's earlier filed
Motion for Summary Judgment. R. p. 613. The district court granted the County's
motion to suspend briefing on Gillmor's motion (R. p. 709), and briefing proceeded
on the County's motion.
After briefing, on February 26, 2007, the district court heard oral argument
on the County's summary judgment motion. In its 40-page Ruling and Order dated
March 5, 2007, the district court discussed the claims asserted in both actions and
summarized the arguments of the parties. R. pp. 766-805. It then focused its
inquiry on whether the actions were timely commenced. R. p. 799. As part of that
inquiry, the district court evaluated whether the claims were simply facial challenges,
or constituted bona fide as-applied claims based upon the plat applications.

5
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. p. 800.
The district court concluded that the material facts were not in dispute,
ruled essentially as follows:
However characterized or labeied5 plaintiffs1 claims
are not really an appeal from a land use decision as applied
to them, but are a claim that the ordinances are facially
invalid and the enactment of the ordinances was the land
use decision. The claims of plaintiffs are that these
ordinances are not valid in any situation rather than that
the ordinances are merely invalid as applied to them.
There was no land use decision other than to adopt the
ordinances in reality because plaintiffs' applications for
development were nothing more themselves than a
challenge to the ordinance scheme. Thus the challenge is
untimely even if the claim is that the ordinances are void
ab initio. There is no dispute that Gillmor's application
was considered in a public meeting and the minutes show
that and plaintiffs have not properly shown that fact is in
dispute. The prior denials of applications were proper
because the applications did not conform to the thenexisting General Plan or Development Code. The claims
in those applications were that the ordinances were invalid
and the applications were couched in those terms. Gillmor
brought suit in 1998 and claimed the ordinances were
void ab initio and that suit was dismissed and the county
and other developers worked within conditions of the
ordinances and this challenge was then brought in 2004.
The time frame to appeal and seek judicial review
governs these issues. To allow parties to challenge
ordinances at any, time without any time limit would
defeat the purposes of the legislation, CLUDMA, which
seeks resolutions of land use issues. Any applicant could
file for development permission and when rejected no
matter how improper or faulty the application, or no
matter what weaknesses were in the sought-for
development, claim at any time that the ordinance was
invalid. That would eliminate the appeals provisions of
the legislation and render parts of C I ^ D M A meaningless.
No one could ever rely on the ordinance framework.
Here, again, the claim is that this legislation is void and
was void from the beginning. That challenge should have
and could have been brought timely after the ordinance's
enactment and within the statutory time-frame.
Ruling and Order, R. pp. 800-02.

6
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Gillmor timely filed her Notice of Appeal on March 23, 2007.
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
i.

Reply to Gillmor's Fact Statement

The Court will note that Gillmor's statement of what she calls "relevant facts"
consists in major part of assertions relating to the merits of her claims that the 1997
General Plan and 1998 Development Code were invalid for a number of reasons.,
Aplts/ Br. pp. 8-13. Because the district court did not rule on the merits of these
claims, many if not most of Gillmor's factual assertions are essentially irrelevant to
this appeal.
The Court will also note that Gillmor's description of other "facts" concerning
her land use applications supports the district court's determinations on review of the
County's decisions that such applications were: 1) not bona fide applications for
approval, but rather part of an orchestrated facial attack on the existing ordinances;
and 2) properly denied and not arbitrary, capricious or illegal because they did not
comply, or make any attempt to comply, with the existing ordinances.
For example, in describing her "amendment application and SPA application"
Gillmor asserts:
Gillmor determined that further attempts to develop the
Property pursuant to the Development Ordinances as
written would only result in delays with no guarantee (or
even hope) of a reasonable outcome. [HI In light of those
uncertainties, in early 2004, Gillmor submitted to the
County an application to amend the Development
Ordinances.
IdL p. 13-14. Similarly, in describing her "Plat Application," Gillmor asserts:
Gillmor determined after investigating the potential with
her land use planner that any SPA application (which was
the only mechanism for Gillmor to approach any
economically viable density for the Gillmor Property and
the Gillmor Trust Property) was unlikely to be considered
in a timely, reasonable, legal, constitutional, or rational
7
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basis and would with almost complete certainty be
considered in an arbitrary, capricious, irrational,
unreasonable, unconstitutional and illegal manner
requiring, as s condition of any approval, the Voluntary"
contribution of exactions that would exceed those
allowable at law. Gillmor and her advisors also concluded
that the Development Ordinances [of 1997 and 1998]
were illegal and unenforceable for, among others, the
reasons specified in this Brief.... [11] Based on those
determinations and in light of the certainty that an
unfavorable result would be obtained through the
County's development process, . . . Gillmor determined
that she was enutied to submit a plat of subdivision for the
development of the Property in compliance with § 17-27804, U.C.A. (2004).
I d pp. 18-19.
Although Gillmor recites what she considers to be the positive aspects of the
amendment and SPA applications (Id. pp. 14-15), she does not dispute and goes on
to recite that the BCC denied the applications because they "did not meet the criteria
set forth in the 1998 Development Code." I d p. 17. See also id p. 18 (SPA
application denied "on the basis that it did not comply with the Development
Ordinances."). Similarly, with respect to the Plat Application, Gillmor admits, as
she must, that it was returned unprocessed by the Community Development
Department because:
the 1998 Development Code and the 1997 General Plan
constituted the applicable law of the County and that
Gillmor would have to follow the processes set forth in
and perpetuated by the 1998 Development Code and the
1997 General Plan to obtain any right that would allow
the development of the Property at the densities reflected
in the Plat Application . . . .
I d p. 22.
One other aspect of Gillmor's factual recitations merits comment. Gillmor
asserts that the County's BOA considered Gillmor's administrative appeal of the
Community Development Department's decision to return Gillmor's Plat

8
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Application. I d p. 23. Gillmor goes on to imply that the BOA had the authority to
consider the appeal on its merits, and argues that the County should have provided a
"record" of the BOA proceedings for either the district court or this Court or both
to review. I d pp. 23-25.
In fact, however, and contrary to Gillmor's implication here, the County did
make transcripts of the BOA proceedings available to Gillmor's counsel, and those
transcripts were provided to the district court as part of the summary judgment
proceedings. See Exhibits to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiffs5
Exhibits"), Vol 4, Exs. 126 and 128. See also County's Reply Memorandum, R. p.
738 (quoting from transcript). In submitting the record^ the County expressly told
the district court and Gillmor's counsel:
The County has or will produce for Plaintiffs all of the
documents which it believes constitute the record of
proceedings before the County. The County submits the
portion or that record it relies upon herein as a bound
addendum of exhibits to this memorandum, and expects
Plaintiffs will submit any remaining portions of the record
which they deem relevant or material.
R. p. 193.
Moreover and perhaps more importantly, as more fully set forth hereafter it is
undisputed the Plat Application was submitted premised on Gillmor's unilateral
determination that the development ordinances were invalid and the property was
thus completely "unzoned." As Gillmor seems to recognize,4 both before the district
4

In her brief, Gillmor states:

[T]he County^ requirement that the Applications be consistent with
the 1998 Development Code means that the County attempted to enforce an
illegal code. In that respect, Gillmor is not seeking review of a body^s "factsensitive use of its discretionary powers." Furthermore, to the extent that
Gillmor claims that the County's decisions were arbitrary and capricious,
Gillmor is hot disputing the nonexistent findings of fact by the BCC nor the
BOA. Accordingly, Gillmor has satisfied her burden to marshal evidence
9
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court and here a review of the County's decision not to accept the Plat Application
collapses into a question whether the development ordinances were timely
challenged, and if they were whether they were valid ordinances in the first instance.
The BOA had no authority to make these determinations, and thus there is no
relevant "record" of the BOA proceedings to review.
ii.

The County's Statement of Facts,

In reaching its decision, the district court relied upon the procedural history
and facts submitted by the County regarding adoption of the ordinances in question,
prior actions by Gillmor in challenging the ordinances, and the County's legislative
and other processes involved in consideration of Gillmor>s various applications and
submissions. The district court ruled that Gillmor had not raised genuine disputes as
to these facts, and Gillmor does not challenge that ruling on appeal. Accordingly, in
order to put the district court's ruling in proper context the County submits the facts
supporting its summary judgment motion and upon which it relies here. They are as
follows:5
1.

After an involved and lengthy public process, which included members

of the development community as well as the local media, on December 15,1997,
the Summit County Board of County Commissioners ("BCC") adopted the 1997
Snyderville Basin General Plan (the cc1997 Plan") by Ordinance 321. R. pp. 19396; Appendix ("App.") Exhibits ("Exs.") 1-10.
supporting the BCCs and BOA's findings.
Aplts.5 Br. at 36 n. 7.
5

The exhibits both the County and Gillmor relied upon below were submitted
as appendixes in separate looseleaf binders. The district court clerk did not paginate
or index these binders, but they are contained in the district court record transmitted
to this Court. Accordingly, the County will cite directly to the appendixes of
exhibits as it did in its memoranda below, as well as to the record where the record is
paginated.
10
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2.

After a similarly involved process, the BCC subsequently adopted the

1998 Snyderville Basin Development Code (the "1998 Code55) on March 9,1998.
R. pp. 193-96; App. Exs. 3,4,11-15.
3.

Gillmor was aware of the adoption of the 1997 Plan and 1998 Code,

and in July 1998, Gillmor and Hamlet Homes, an entity holding an option on the
Gillmor property, filed a Complaint challenging the adoption of the 1997 Plan and
1998 Code. R. p. 196; App. Ex. 17. In that complaint, the plaintiffs asserted that
the 1997 Plan and 1998 Code violated constitutional guarantees of procedural due
process, substantive due process, and equal protection, and prayed that "the Court
declare Summit County's [1997] General Plan and [1998] Code to be invalid and
void ab initio." I d
4.

That litigation was terminated by order based upon the parties'

stipulation and motion on June 2, 1999, dismissing Gillmor's claims without
prejudice. R. p. 196; App. Ex. 18. Gillmor did not refile that action within the oneyear savings statute then applicable.
5.

It is undisputed that subsequently, and in the years after the 1997 Plan

and 1998 Code were adopted, similarly situated landowners worked with and
obtained development approvals pursuant to the 1997 Plan and 1998 Code. R. p.
197, (citing Evergreen Compl./Pet., IfU 178 -181).
6.

Many years later, in January of 2004, Gillmor applied for legislative

changes to the 1997 Plan and 1998 Code to allow development of property in a
manner inconsistent with the 1998 Code. R. p. 197; App. Ex. 19. In particular, the
application sought a text amendment to the 1998 Code, an amendment to the
General 1997 Plan, and a Specially Planned Area application and rezone in order to
accommodate the development proposal. I d

11
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7.

The Snyderville Basin Planning Commission ("SBPC") considered the

application at a public hearing. R. pp. 197-201; App. Ex. 20. Gillmofs counsel,
Mr. Baird, addressed the SBPQ where he made many of the same claims Gillmor
asserts in this action:
Mr. Baird recalled that he has filed a number of lawsuits
against the County stating that the Code and Plan are
unintelligible, unpredictable, and illegal in many ways.
The maps do not make sense and are not legal. The
matrix cannot be understood, and no one can predict what
will come out of the matrix process. The SPA process,
matrix process, and base zoning allow the Planning
commission and County to violate impact fee laws,
exaction laws, Supreme Court tests, and the Dolan case,
because they allow the County to exact more development
approval conditions than could be done in a
proportionality test under Dolan. . . . Mr. Baird stated
that, because of these problems the applicant tried to
create rational zones based on adjacent properties and
sound planning principles.
Id.
8.

A number of persons also spoke in opposition to Plaintiffs5 proposal

and Mr. Baird's comments. A representative of Citizens Allied for Responsible
Growth ("CARG") stated, in pertinent part:
Ms. Gillmor wants to build 303 residential units on 318
acres spanning two neighborhoods identified in the
General Plan as the East Basin and Old Ranch Road
Planning Areas. CARG does not believe the proposed
development meets the planning goals for the two
applicable neighborhoods. It appears Ms. Gillmor agrees,
because she is seeking to change the Plan and Code to
achieve her density goals for the property. . . . [S]he
acknowledges that her application proposes more density
than the current Code would permit and that the density
proposed is consistent with the surrounding
neighborhoods and that densities allowed by the current
Code are "utterly unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious,"
Ms. Gillmor states that because [the neighboring
developments] exist she should be able to develop her
property in a like manner. Ms. Kinsman stated that
argument is without merit. As indicated in the staff
report, those developments arose from a consent
12
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agreement based on a concept approval made under the
Development Code I effect in 19o3, and circumstances in
the basin have changed considerably in the last 20 years. .
. . A property owner is charged with the responsibility to
keep abreast of those [zoning] changes and making their
objections known when they are proposed and before they
are adopted by the community. It is clear in the submittal
language that this is not a good faith application for an
amendment and is instead groundwork to a legal challenge
to the validity of the Plan and Code. . . . the argument
that it is impossible to get development approvea under
the current Code is unfounded. The process may be long
and arduous, but it is not illegal.

9.

Other citizens made similar comments:
Chris Hague stated that he supports the staffs report and
agrees with Ms. Kinsman that the application is designed
to foster litigation. He believed the Planning Commission
should reject the proposal and not be intimidated by Mr.
Baird ana Ms. Gillmor and their threats of litigation. . . .
He asked where the applicant was in 1998 when the Code
was adopted, because tliey could have provided input at
that time. He hoped the Commission would reject the
applicant's request. He stated that, if this change were
allowed, every developer would seek to obtain special
zoning for their own development which should not be
allowed under the Code.

Greg Lawson stated that he has lived on Old Ranch Road
since 1985 and has been involved in community planning
issues since arriving in Park City in 1976. He was on the
Park City Planning commission and served on several
citizen advisory committees to the County and is project
manager of a land development project in Summit
County. He is familiar with the Gillmor property and
used to run and walk on it before it was necessary to post
it. He sympathized with problems the Gillmors nave with
trespassing and disrespect to their property. The land is
attractive for development, and he was surprised the
applicant had found it necessary to make amendments to
the General Plan and Code since it could be developed
sensitively and profitably under the existing General Plan
and Code. He lias worked with citizens who have spend
thousands of hours putting the General Plan and
neighborhood plans together. Mr. Lawson agreed with
13
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the staff report

Christopher Robinson stated that he lives on Old ranch
road. He is a developer and landowner in other places,
understands the complexities of developing land, and is
sympathetic to property rights. However, the felt the
proper time to have opposed the matrix and current
General Plan was when they were processed. The
surrounding properties were developed under the Consent
Agreements and were grandfathered, and the County did
not have a choice. He stated that his land was downzoned, and he had to make a choice whether to file a
lawsuit or accept it. He felt that the land could be
developed consistent with the existing General Plan and
Code in a profitable and desirable way. He felt it was
unfair to change the rules at this time. Other land would
be in a similar situation. He encouraged the Commission
to leave the General Plan and Code as it is.

Id
10.

Planning staff had submitted a report to the SBPC recommending

denial of Plaintiffs3 application on the grounds, inter alia, that: (1) "the proposed
amendment is not consistent with the goals, objectives and policies of the [existing]
General Plan,5' (2) "the amendment changes existing restrictions on the property that
will unduly affect nearby property,'5 (3) "the amendment is proposed to be applied
to property owned by one property owner at this time," and (4) "the specific
development plan is not in compliance with the standards and criteria described in
Chapters 3 and 4 of the [existing] Code." R. p. 200; App. Ex. 21.
11.

After hearing other comments, some favoring but most opposing the

applications, the SBPC voted unanimously to forward a recommendation to the
BCC that the application be denied on the groimds that the application did not meet
the criteria established by the 1998 Code. R. pp. 200-01;App. Ex. 20.
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12.

On or about May 26, 2004, Gillmor5s application came on for public

hearing before the BCC. The BCC were provided tapes and minutes of the
proceedings before the SBPC described above, and heard comment from Mr. Baird
consistent with his comments before the SBPC. Citizens also made similar
comments. R. p. 201; App. Ex. 22.
13.

Planning staff submitted a report to the BCC recommending denial of

Plaintiffs' applications on the grounds, inter alia, that: (1) "the proposed
amendment is not consistent with the goals, objectives and policies of the [existing]
General Plan," (2) "the amendment changes existing restrictions on the property that
will unduly affect nearby property," (3) ccthe amendment is proposed to be applied
to property owned by one property owner at this time," and (4) "the specific
development plan is not in compliance with the standards and criteria described in
Chapters 3 and 4 of the [existing] Code." R. p. 201; App. Ex. 23.
14.

The chairman of the SBPC also addressed the BCC, noting as follows:
Max Greenhalgh, Chair of the Snyderville Basin Planning
commission, asked the Commissioners to consider the
context in which the present Development Code and
General Plan came into existence. In the 1980's there was
a permitting system which allowed almost all
development, and most of the development surrounding
Ms. Gilmor's land started during that time. The tiering
system was adopted in the early 1990Ts to try to stop
development of the community in a haphazard way. He
believed Ms. Gilmor's property was in Tier 2, with zoning
of approximately one unit per 10 or 20 acres. However,
Tier 2 could not develop until Tier 1 was built out, which
was frustrating for the landowners and resulted in
lawsuits. When the Snyderville Basin Planning
Commission was created about eight and a haff years ago,
they set out to develop a plan that was homemade and
community based. Tney met with landowners and
developers for two years and received broad-based
support. The current system offers base density that is
about the same as the tier system and offers incentives for
clustering development in the least environmentally
sensitive areas ofthe property. He was unaware of any
15
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projects having been denied under the current system. If
this proposed new zoning were to be approved, it would
not just impact the Old Ranch Road neighborhood, but
the zoning could be used by any other property that is
similar to Ms. Gillmofs property. That is nis main
concern, and he does not want to remove the heart and
soul from the general Plan. He agreed that the General
Plan and the Development Code need to be amended and
need to be more predictable, and the Planning
Commission is in the process of accomplishing that. . . .
R. pp. 201-02; App. Ex. 22.
15.

After hearing other comments and after discussion, the BCC voted 2 to

1 to deny the application on the grounds that the application did not meet the
criteria established by the 1998 Code for the requested changes, primarily because
the requested changes were not consistent with the existing general plan. R. p. 202;
App. Ex. 22.
16.

Shortly after the application discussed above, on February 20, 2004,

Gillmor submitted what she refers to as her SPA rezone application for a change to
the 1998 Code that would allow development of other property, again in a way that
was not possible under the 1998 Code. This SPA application requested favorable
legislative action by the County to amend the general plan and development code so
as to be consistent with her requested planned development. R. p. 202; App. Ex.
24.
17.

The SPA rezone application requested the County to establish two new

zoning districts, a Commercial/Light Industrial District and a Support Housing
District, and apply them to 210 acres of the Gillmor's property located near the
Quinn's Junction area of the Snyderville Basin. I d
18.

The SBPC considered the application at a work session on May 25,

2004. R. p. 203; App. Ex. 25. Planning staff noted that they had discussed with the
applicants the fact that, independent of the pending application by a neighboring
16
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property owner or Plaintiffs3 application, the SBPC was considering the possibility of
adding a commercial zone in this area as part of broader Development Code
revisions that were being considered.
19.

Id

Regarding the merits of the proposal, the commissioners noted, in part:
Commissioner Brennan felt the proposal would turn
Highway 40 into an industrial corridor from Silver
Summit to Quin's Junction, which is not consistent with
the General Plan, The Silver Creek area has an existing
industrial designation which has been that was for 20 years .
and is not close to buildout. Zoning an additional 200
acres would only spread out industrial development. He
did not want to create a new zoning designation without
understanding what other parcels in the Basin the
designation would apply to. He noted that there are
properties with similar qualities which could argue for the
same designation. Creating a large industrial zoned area
next to a large residential support area [as contemplated by
the application] may conflict with the existing Village
Center designation in Silver Creek. Commissioner
Brennan expressed concern about allowing applicants to
rewrite their own zoning designations for their own
interests, which he believed was a conflict of interest that
serves the special interests of the property owner.
Commissioner Callaway referred to the commercial areas
discussed in conjunction with the Development Code
revisions. . . . This location could be appropriate, but the
proposed development standards and language do not fit
within the General Plan and Development Code. . . .

Commissioner Voth commented that the difference
between this proposal and the [neighboring] plan is the
opportunity for redevelopment. The part of the plan the
Commission was least enthusiastic about was the sprawl
proposed to the north. He felt this plan suggests further
sprawl. . . .
I d After its discussion, the SBPC planned a field trip/site visit to the property to
further study the proposal. I d
20.

After the site visit and during the summer of 2004, the parties discussed

the fact that the SBPC was continuing to evaluate the entire area. In August 2004,
17
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and in response to an inquiry concerning the application, County planning staff
wrote Gillmor's representative as follows:
I am in receipt of your letter relating to the application
status of the Gillmor Quinn's Junction land Development
Code and General Plan Amendment requests. As we have
discussed a number of times, the Planning Commission
continues to evaluate this entire area and is considering
making some zone changes to better address the types of
uses that exist on the northeast corner of the Quinn's
intersection. The Planning,Commission is anxious to have
further discussions about appropriate land uses and zoning
in the Quinn's Junction area and have committed to spend
work session time to further explore options. The
Planning Commission is well aware of your Plan and Code
Amendment application, as well as an application
submitted by another property owner in the area. The
initial discussions by the Planning Commission have not
included expanding an industrial/commercial zone nearly
to the extent that you have requested in your amendment
request, but there will certainly be more discussions and
public hearings before any new zone is applied.
While you certainly have every right to request that the
item be scheduled for formal Public Hearing and action by
the Planning Commission, it may be productive at this
time for you to be an active participant in the larger
discussion about appropriate land uses and zoning at the
Quinn's Junction area. After you confer with your client,
please let me know how you wish to proceed.
R. pp. 204-05; App. Ex. 26.
21.

Gillmor nevertheless determined to proceed with formal public hearings

and action on her own application, and the SBPC considered the matter at a public
hearing on September 14, 2004. R, p. 205; App. Ex. 27. At that hearing, the
SBPC reviewed the staff recommendation, and heard from Gillmor's representative
in favor and a member of the public who spoke against the proposed amendments.
Thereafter, the SBPC voted unanimously to forward a recommendation to the BCC
that the application be denied on the grounds that it did not meet the criteria
established by the 1998 Code. I d
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22.

On or about October 13, 2004, GiUmofs SPA application came on for

public hearing before the BCC The BCC were provided staff reports, the SBPCs
recommendations, and listened to the applicants3 representative and one member of
the public. In response to a question regarding the SBPCs recommendation,
planning staff:
explained that one thing which may have weighed into the
Planning Commission's decision and staffs
recommendation is that the General Plan currendy
addresses the necessity for some industrial zoning in this
location. The Planning Commission has been discussing a
rezone of some existing industrial area as a service
commercial or industrial zone and perhaps expanding the
area. The Planning Commission is also looking at
community commercial zones in the Silver Creek and
Commerce Center areas. The Planning Commission has
spent hours considering this type of commercial zoning
and is starting to hone in on a new zone in this location.
Ms. Shepard indicated that a portion of the Gillmor
property would be included in the new zone as it is
currently being discussed. However, the Planning
Commission does not believe the remainder of the
Gillmor property would be appropriate for a service
commercial designation. Because the Planning
Commission is working on this zoning, and due to the
location of the property, the Planning Commission
forwarded a negative recommendation on this particular
request. . . . Ms. Shepard referred to the criteria for
making General Plan and Development Code amendments
and stated that the Planning Commission reviewed those
criteria and could not make a finding for approval of the
proposed General Plan and Development Code
Amendments.
R. pp. 205-06; App. Ex. 28.
23.

The Staff report submitted by the planning staff noted that the SBPCs

negative recommendation was based upon findings that: (1) "the proposed General
Plan amendments do not meet the criteria set forth in section 7.2D of the
Snyderville Basin Development Code33; and (2) "the proposed Development Code
amendments do not meet the criteria set forth in sections 7.3(1) and 1.3(2) of the
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Snyderville Basin Development Code." R. p. 206; App. Ex. 29.
24.

After discussion on October 13, 2004, the BCC voted 2 to 1 to deny

Gillmor's SPA rezone application on the grounds that the application did not meet
the criteria established by the 1998 Code for the requested changes, again primarily
because the changes were not consistent with the existing General Plan. R. p. 207;
App. Ex. 28.
25.

Gillmor timely filed her original Complaint/Petition in June 2004,

within 30 days of when the BCC voted to deny the first application for a zone
change and general plan amendment discussed above. R. 1. Gillmor then filed an
Amended Complaint/Petition on November 11, 2004. R. p. 59.
26.

In the meantime, on November 3, 2004, Gillmor submitted a "Plat

Application.5' R. pp. 97-98. The Plat Application expressly did not request the
County to make plan or code amendments, or to process the application under the
1997 Plan and 1998 Code. Instead, accompanying and supplementing the Plat
Application were letters stating, in pertinent part:
After a careful and thorough review of the County's
Snyderville Basin Development Code (hereinafter the "Code")
and applicable state and federal law, the Owners have determined
that key portions of the Code are not and cannot be considered
to be legally valid or enforceable* As County officials have
known tor a long time, the current Code is so vague, defective,
undefined, discriminatory and overreaching that it violates the
Owners' state and federal rights to, among other things,
procedural due process, substantive due process, equal protection
and freedom from government sponsored extortionate activity.
The Code is also unenforceable because it was adopted in
violation of the County Land Use Development and
Management Act (Chapter 27 of Title 17 of the Utah Code),
contains no valid zoning map, contains other deficiencies,
provides for the extraction or illegal impact fees and other
improper and excessive exactions, and violates other significant
provisions of law. The Owners claim that, based on the County's
past pattern of activities and actions, the County's Code, on its
race and as applied, does and will violate the Owners' state and
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federally protected rights and results in the unlawful taking and
damage of the Property without just compensation.
With perhaps the arguable exception of Section 5.1 of the
Code [regulating subdivisions], the Owners believe that the
County aoes not currendy have in place any validly enforceable
County ordinance regulating the subdivision or platting of
property. Utah law is clear that when the County has in place an
invalid zoning ordinance, the affected property is to be
considered unzoned. When a property is unzoned, "the property
owners may proceed with any other lawfully intended use. in
such cases, the court is limited to the remedy of declaring the
zoning ordinance void and finding that the property owner
affected is entitled to use this property for any lawful purpose
without regard to the void zoning ordinance.'5 See Carter v. City
of Salina, 773 F.2d251 (10th Cir. 1985) at 255. The resulting
regulatory ordinance vacuum in the Code leaves only applicable
state law to regulate the use of the Owners' Property. The only
state law appearing to regulate theplatting of the Property is
Part 8 of Chapter 27 of Tide 17 ofthe Utah Code Annotated
(the ccUtah Subdivision Act"), Section 804 ofthe Utah
Subdivision Act specifies the only applicable requirements for a
subdivision plat. The Plat submitted herewith complies with
those requirements. Please note that Section 804(2) (c) ofthe
Utah Subdivision Act provides that the County Executive ccshall
approve the plat as provided in [the Utah Subdivision Act.]"
Correspondence from Gerald D. Anderson, dated November 3, 2004, Exhibits to
Plaintiffs3 Motion for Summary Judgment ('Tlaintiffs' Exhibits"), Vol 1, Ex. 2, Vol.
4, Exs. 107,108, 109.6
27.

Because there was no legally binding directive or authority endorsing

these unilateral assertions, the County's Community Development Director, David
Allen, returned the plat applications by letter stating, in pertinent part:
Chapter 3 ofthe Snyderville Basin Development Code
(Code) outlines the appropriate processes for reviewing
development applications in the Snyderville Basin. The
application that was submitted on November 3, 2004,
would be considered a Major Development. Section 6.7
ofthe Code states that a major Development requires a
Sketch Plan application be filed and reviewed, followed by
an application for a Specially Planned Area Zone
Designation. In this case, the proposal would be evaluated
6

A11 the then appellants submitted identical Plat Applications, and this citation
is to all such applications in the record.
21
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based upon the Development Matrix for Major
Development outside a Resort, Town or Village Center
(Section 2.3.F2). An application for final plat ibr a major
development cannot be accepted for processing until and
unless the property is designated a Specially Planned Area
under the provisions of the Code. I nave enclosed the
application requirements for both the Sketch Plan process
and the SPA Kezone process for your use. If you would
like further information on the SPA process for a major
development, I would be happy to discuss that with you.
Inasmuch as the General Plan and Code are regulatory and
are the legally adopted zoning laws in effect over your
property pursuant to authority granted to Summit County
under the County Land Use Management Act (Utah Code
AIHL §17-27-101, et. seq.), it would be a violation of our
existing laws for us to process your application as
submitted.
While we appreciate the allegations you make in your
letter accompanying the application regarding our zoning
regulations, the General Plan and Code are nonetheless me
current legally adopted and applicable laws for us to
process your application as submitted. . . . If you would
like assistance from this office in understanding the
planning process, we would be happy to assist you in that
area as well.
Correspondence from David Allen, dated November 4, 2004, Plaintiffs' Exhibits,
Vol. 4, Exs. 118,119,120,121.
28.

While the County's Motion for Summary Judgment was pending, but

before it was decided, Judge Kimball entered a final judgment in NAACP, Evergreen
Dev., et al v. Summit County, et aL filed in the Federal District Court for the
District of Utah, Civil No. 2:05CV378DAK, In that case, where the original
appellants other than Ms. Gillmor were plaintiffs, Judge Kimball granted the
County's Motion for Summary Judgment holding that the plat applications did not
confer standing to bring claims under the Federal Fair Housing Act. County's
Supplemental Appendix (R. pp. 721-22), Exhibit 2, p. 12, Judge Kimball found, in
pertinent part:
The court finds that Plaintiffs lack standing to
litigate their discriminatory housing claims because they
have not alleged and cannot prove that the County has
utilized the zoning ordinances or other challenged policies
to deny any specific project containing housing which
would allegedly benefit Plaintiffs. The only housing
project Plaintiffs allege the County has denied are the
^property plat" submissions made by the Developer
Plaintiffs based upon the Developer Plaintiffs3 unilateral
assertions that there were no valid zoning ordinances in
22
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place in Summit County. The court finds that no
reasonable jury could find that they were bona fide .
"applications" for development approval. Thus, Plaintiffs'
submission, which unilaterally declared the County's thenexisting General Plan and Development Code invalid and
illegal, wholly failed to comply with the then- existing land
use ordinances.
Id. (citations omitted).
29.

Gillmor did appeal Director Allen's administrative decision to return

the Plat Application without processing the application. The County's BOA met
twice to consider the appeals, once on December 20, 2004, and again on January 20,
2005. Plaintiffs' Exhibits, Vol 4, Exs. 126, 128. Transcripts of varying quality
were made of both meetings. I d Before the first meeting, the BOA was told:
The appeal tonight is an appeal of Dave Allen's decision
on the finding of non-compliance and rejection of
development applications for final plats. So the core
uestion is really whether the community development
irector correctly applied the existing code, as it is
currently adopted - the [1998] Snyaerville Basin

S

by the board of adjustment.
Plaintiffs' Exhibits Vol. 4, Ex. 126. And before the second meeting the chair stated:
Before we start the meeting, I would like to make a
statement so that we can aS have an idea of where we're
with this, and what we are here to hear. First, the
§oing
ummit County Board of Adjustment will hear and decide
on this appeal, on whether the community development
director and/or staff erred in denyingthe final approval of
plans on [the applications]. . . . [HjThe Board of
Adjustment will hear this appeal with the presumption the
development code was binding, legal and in full effect at
the time the administrative decision was made. And
arguing for the appellant as to the development codes legal
deficiency will not be heard or considered on this appear
rr
matter.
I d Ex. 128.
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT
Gillmor's 64 page, 389 paragraph Amended Complaint/Petition for Review
consists essentially of an extended argument that the County's 1997 Plan and 1998
Code were improperly adopted, dependent upon "unintelligible land use planing
maps," imposed "unreasonably low base densities," essentially prohibited all
development, etc. The pleading sought the court's orders invalidating the County's
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entire land use and development scheme, and clearly constitutes a facial challenge to
the County's 1997 Plan and 1998 Code.
Based on the premise that the 1997 Plan and 1998 Code were, and could and
should properly be declared^ facially invalid and unenforceable, Gillmor also
petitioned for review of the County's decisions: (1) to deny Gillmor's application to
change the 1997 Plan and to amend the text of the 1998 Code in order to allow for
proposed developments that were inconsistent with the then existing 1997 Plan and
1998 Code; and (2) to reject a Plat Application Gillmor submitted based on her own
unilateral determination that the 1997 Plan and 1998 Code were "illegal and
unenforceable5' and her property was thus "unzoned" The crux of Gillmor's
argument below, and on appeal, is that because the County's development
ordinances were, or should have been, invalid and unenforceable, the County's
decisions to deny her rezone applications and the Plat Application based on the then
existing general plan and ordinances were "illegal" pursuant to section 17-27-1001.
Although remarkable for the same "opprobrious epithets" and accusations of
unfairness noted by the Utah Supreme Court in Patterson v. American Fork City.
2003 UT 71128, 67 P.3d 466, 475 (upholding 12(b)(6) dismissal of plaintiffs'
claims the City's various adverse land use decisions subjected them to "fundamentally
unfair procedures, gross abuse of power, and invidious discrimination"), Gillmor's
action largely ignores the overriding purpose of the 17-27-1001 proceeding, which
is to provide for a timely, judicial review of land use decisions that gives proper
deference to the fact that a local land use authority has already conducted public
hearings and proceedings in which the aggrieved party was given an opportunity to
present its arguments.
As the legislative record establishes, the 1997 Plan and 1998 Code were
adopted after an extensive public process involving many hearings before both the
County's Planning Commission and the Board of County Commissioners no later
than March 1998, when the 1998 Code was adopted. Shortly thereafter Gillmor
herself actually commenced and then dismissed litigation against the County making
many of the same claims she makes her and seeking to have the same ordinances
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declared "void ab initio." In the meantime, both the County and other landowners
have worked within the framework of the challenged 1997 Plan and 1998 Code to
seek and grant development approvals from March 1998 to December 2004, when
the 1997 Plan and 1998 Code were repealed and new ordinances adopted as part of
comprehensive amendments.
CC

A facial challenge to a land use regulation becomes ripe upon enactment of

the regulation itself." Tolman v. Logan City, 2007 UT App. 260, II9. The district
court correctly concluded that Gillmor's delay of approximately seven years to
challenge the facial validity of the 1997 Plan and 1998 Code is fatal to her
complaints seeldng a declaration that the 1997 Plan and 1998 Code are "illegal and
unenforceable." Such a facial challenge is untimely and clearly barred by limitations.
To the extent Gillmor's complaints could be considered bonafide petitions for
review of the County's decisions to deny the applications Gillmor did in fact submit,
the County conceded that the petitions were timely. Such a review could not
consider claims the 1997 Plan and 1998 Code were facially invalid, however, because
those claims were no longer judicially cognizable and were not established by anyone
other than Gillmor herself.
Upon review in light of the existing, and presumptively valid ordinances, it is
clear that the County's decisions were wholly consistent with the existing general
plan and development ordinances, and could not be considered arbitrary, capricious
or illegal in any way. In short, the district court correcdy concluded that County
was entided to judgment on all of Gillmor3s claims as a matter of law.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT GILLMOR'S
FACIAL CHALLENGES TO THE 1997 PLAN AND 1998 CODE
WERE TIME-BARRED.
When a landowner makes a facial challenge to a zoning ordinance, "he or she

argues that any application of the ordinance is unconstitutional." SMX
Technologies, Inc. v. Gasconade County, 105 R3d 1195,1198-99 n.I (8th
Cir. 1997).

cc

When one makes an 'as-applied5 challenge, he or she is attacking only

the decision that applied the ordinance to his or her property, not the ordinance in
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general/5 Id,
In State v. Gallegos, 2009 UT 42 the Court noted, in pertinent part:
When asserting an as-applied challenge, the party claims that, under the facts
of his particular case, the statute was appliea. . . in an unconstitutional
manner. In contrast, when a party presents a facial challenge, he seeks to
vindicate not only his own rignts, but those of others who may be adversely
impacted by the statute in question.
2009 UT 42, II14 (quotations, citations omitted).
There can be no serious question that Gillmor's operative complaint in this
action "argues that any application of the ordinance is unconstitutional," and is thus
a facial challenge to the ordinances. See, e.g., Amended CompL/Pet., R. pp. 59-123.
For example, without reference to any application whatsoever, it describes the 1997
Plan and 1998 Code as an "illegal land use denial scheme" (id. R. pp. 65-91), and
describes the "cumulative effect of the illegalities" to be that:
As a result of result of the numerous failures and
illegalities specifically described above, the County's land
use regulatory scheme as expressed in the Code, the
General Plan and the other relevant documents Jails to
comply with CLUDMA and violates the Constitution of
the united States and the Constitution of the State of
Utah and other applicable laws.
IsL R- p. 91.
Gillmor's Complaint/Petition goes on to seek the court's orders invalidating
the County's entire legislatively adopted zoning scheme, and expressly requests the
court's orders "preventing the County's enforcement of the General Plan, the
Revised General Plan, the Code, all ordinances, regulations and policies based
thereon, and all other ordinances purporting to regulate land use in the Basin . . . ."
I d R. p. 1 2 2 /
As the district court recognized, even the Petition for Review portions of
Gillmor's pleadings which challenge the County's decisions to deny Gillmor's rezone
applications and her Plat Application cannot be characterized as making an "as
applied" challenge to the 1997 Plan and 1998 Code, a challenge asserting "that,
7

On appeal, Gilknor continues to illustrate the facial nature of her challenge to
the development ordinances by arguing the ordinances are "void ab initio." See,
e.g., Aplts.' Br. pp. 43-44 ("Gillmor was entitled to obtain a declaration that the
Development Ordinances were void ab initio.").
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under the facts of [her] particular case, the statute was applied . . . in an
unconstitutional manner." Gallegos, 1114. This is so because, as Gillmor admits:8
a) the first two applications sought significant amendments or changes in the
challenged ordinances in order to allow development that would not be possible
under the existing ordinances; and 2) the Plat Application sought development that
would be possible only if the development ordinances didn't exist at all.
CC

A facial challenge to a land use regulation becomes ripe upon enactment of

the regulation itself." Tolman v. Logan City. 2007 UT App. 260, II 9 (citing Smith
Inv. Co. v. Sandy City. 958 P,2d 245, 251 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (noting that the
only question involved in a facial challenge to a land use regulation is cccwhether the
mere enactment of the [ordinance] constitutes [a substantive due process violation
or] a taking3" (alterations in original)).
In Tolman, this Court went on to hold:
The Tolmans' takings claim based on the City's
1989 ordinance is a facial challenge that became ripe upon
the enactment of the ordinance and is now barred oy the
statute of limitations. . . . The catch-all four-year statute
of limitations contained in Utah Code section
78-12-25(3) applies to actions not governed by other
statutes or limitation. See Utah Coae Ann. §
78-12-25(3)(2002). TEsTour-year statute of limitations
has been specifically applied to a takings claim. In recent
years, a new statute, which likely has retroactive
application, would reduce the statute of limitations period
for bringing a facial challenge to a zoning ordinance to
just thirw days following the enactment. See Utah Code
Ann. § lb-9a-801fSHSupp. 2006). As thfTolmans'
challenge to the 1989 ordinance came fifteen years after
the ordinance's enactment, it is barred as a matter of law.
Tolman, U 10 (some citations omitted). See also Foutz v. City of South Tordan:
2004 UT 75,1114,100 P.3d 1171 (ccWe therefore hold that plaintiffs, as parties
seeking redress from a municipal land use decision, were obligated to comply with
the requirements of the Appeals section [that suit to be brought within 30 days]33).
The district court's decision in this case presaged and is now fully supported
by the Tolman decision. As Gillmor's own 1998 complaint recognized, Gillmor's

8

Gillmor states in her brief: ccThe crux of Gillmor's complaints with respect to
the denials of her applications is that the criteria established in the Development
Ordinances were illegal at the time of those applications.33 Aplts.3 Br. p. 36, n. 7.
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facial challenges to the 1997 Plan and 1998 Code, whether based upon alleged
takings, substantive or procedural due process, equal protection or "cumulative
effect of illegalities" theories, "became ripe upon the enactment of the ordinance [s]."
Her currently operative pleadings seeking to invalidate the ordinances and making
claims based upon their alleged facial invalidity, filed some seven years after that
enactment, are barred by both the 30 day limitation period in the CLUDMA and the
four year catch-all period in the judicial code. I d
Somewhat surprisingly, Gillmor's brief fails to even mention this Court's
decision in Tolman. Rather, she argues that the two applicable limitations
provisions should not bar her claims for the same reasons she asserted below. She
again cites Hatch v. Boulder Town, 2001 UT App. 55; Call v. City of West Tordan,
727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1986); and Snyder v. Murray City, 2003 UT 13.
Significandy, however, none of these cases reaches the limitations question at
issue here, and none of Gillmor's arguments are supported by apposite authority or
valid policy. First, for example, Gillmor argues that the 1997 Plan and 1998 Code
were void ab initio, and could therefore be challenged at any time. This argument is
inconsistent with the "legislative intent to encourage the quick resolution of disputes
over land use decisions and to recognize the authority granted to municipal
decision-making bodies" which the Supreme Court recognized as the basis of the
limitations provisions. Foutz, II15.
Moreover, the argument would render two applicable limitations statutes
inoperative, which is contrary to the well-established rule that "statutes should be
construed so that no part or provision will be inoperative or superfluous, void or
insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy another/3 State v. Teffries,
2009 UT 57, If 9, 217 P.3d 265, 268 (punctuation, citations omitted). See also
Foutz, If 12 ('We are not, however, free to construe the sections at issue in isolation
or to adopt an interpretation that would render one of them meaningless. Rather,
we read them in conjunction one with another, attempting to give effect to and
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harmonize their collective provisions.").9
Gillmor also appears to rely on Carter v. Salina, 773 R2d 251 (10th Cir.
1985) for the proposition that she is free to challenge at any time an ordinance
which was void ab initio. However, as the Tenth Circuit recognized in Thatcher
Enterprises v. Cache County Corp.. 902 R2d 1472 (10th Cir. 1990), Carter is
distinguishable.
In Thatcher, the plaintiff argued that the zoning ordinance which they
challenged was also void at inception and cited Carter in support of their argument
that they could make an untimely challenge to the ordinance. Thatcher, 902 F.2d at
1475. The Thatcher court recognized that the plaintiffs in Carter were entitled to
proceed because: (1) they had not received actual or constructive notice of the
adoption of the ordinance; and (2) they "immediately sought relief from the county
upon receiving notice of the zoning ordinance.55 I d
As in Thatcher, the facts here are different than those supporting the Carter
ruling. Not only was there an involved public process leading to the adoption of the
1997 Plan and 1998 Code, but Gillmor had actual notice of their enactment and
9

These principles are illustrated by the reasoning of other courts who have
addressed the Void ab initio" arguments in the limitations context. In Schadler v.
Zoning Hearing Bd. of Weisenberg Township, 814 A.2d 1265 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003),
the court noted, in pertinent part:
. , . [Plaintiffs] assertion that a municipal ordinance is
rendered void ab initio any time defects in the process of the
enactment or adoption exist and no time limits apply would
render Section 909.1(a)(2) of the MPC and Section 5571(c)(5)
of the Judicial Code meaningless. In effect, what the provisions
do is to make all ordinances valid, no matter the procedural
defect, unless a challenge is brought within 30 days. Otherwise,
challenges could be brought forever by arguing that the
ordinance is void ab initio because of some defect in its
enactment. No one. then could ever rely on the ordinance with
certainty because it would always be subject to a procedural
challenge. Such an interpretation results in an absurd outcome
and renders Section 909.1(a) (2) of the MPC and Section
5571 (c) (5) of the Judicial Code meaningless, and, therefore
cannot be upheld. [11] Accordingly, the decision of the trial court
is reversed.
814 A.2d at 1266,1270.
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participated in, but failed to pursue, an earlier filed lawsuit which also challenged the
ordinances as void ab initio. Gillmor simply failed to "immediately [seek] relief from
the county upon receiving notice of the zoning ordinance.3'
The Thatcher court went on to expressly recognize the need for finality in
zoning decisions, whether or not they are alleged to be void or voidable:
Whether the reason is called laches, estoppel, waiver, or
public policy, challenges to the procedural invalidity of a
zoning ordinance ana constitutional challenges based
thereon must be brought within a reasonable time from
enactment of the ordinance. If not brought in a timely
manner, the plaintiff will be barred from challenging me
zoning ordinance.
Id, at 1476 (citations omitted). The Tenth Circuit has thus eliminated any
possibility that Carter would serve to prevent the running of an applicable statute of
limitations.
Nor do the other authorities Gillmor cites support her arguments. Call v.
City of West Tordan, 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1986) dealt with enactment of an impact
fee ordinance. The statutory provisions at the time, Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-9-1 to
10-9-30, did not provide for a 30-day limitations period, and the challenge in that
case was brought well within the four-year catchall limitation period. There was,
therefore, no statute of limitations issue. The same was true in Call v. West Jordan,
606 P.2d217 (Utah 1979).
Similarly, in Hatch v. Boulder Town Council, 2001 UT App 55, 21 P.3d
245, the parties did not raise any limitations issue, and limitations was never
addressed. Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13, 73 P.3d 325 does not
address the question of limitations, has no factual or legal similarities with the issues
here, and fails to support the proposition for which Gillmor cites it.10
Finally, Gillmor does not successfully distinguish Foutz or the principles on
which that decision is based. Certainly in Foutz the court did analyze an ordinance
10

Gillmor's citation to Hope v. Baltimore County. 421 A.2d 576 (Md. 1980)
does not help her position. The issue in Hope was only whether a property owner
could appeal a subdivision plat decision direcriy to the circuit court, as opposed to
applying for an administrative appeal, and there was no limitations question
presented. The quotation Gillmor provides is dictum. See Hope, 421 A.2d at 579
(noting in passing that presumption of validity is not controlling).
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claimed to be substantively (as opposed to procedurally) illegal on its face when it:
was adopted. 2004 UT 75 at If 5 ("Plaintiffs' suit alleged that the city had violated
South Jordan City ordinance 97-7 . . . by [the challenged ordinance] changing
property near the Jordan River from an agricultural zone to an office service zone.
The [existing] ordinance specifically excepted property located within the 100-year
flood plain and meander corridor along the Jordan River . . . which shall continue to
be designated on the Future Land Use Plan Map as recreation/open space or
preservation areas."') (citations omitted).
The Foutz court also recognized the importance of reading the LUDMA
provisions to give effect to all of the parts of the statutes. In addition, it recognized
and gave effect to the legislative intent to provide finality to laud use decisions.11
Gillmor's other principle argument is that the existence of the County's
challenged ordinances posed a "continuing violation/' that she was entitled to
challenge at any time. But this argument is also foreclosed by Foutz:
We find plaintiffs' [continuing violation] argument
unpersuasive. The South Jordan City Council met,
discussed, and voted on the Riverpark Site Plan on
February 14,2001. February 14 is therefore the date on
which^tne land use decision was rendered. The limitations
provision of the Appeals section runs from the time the
municipality "renders" a land use "decision,"
not from the
time of an alleged violation. Plaintiffs1 creative attempt to
characterize the city's refusal to reverse its original land use
decision as a series of subsequent decisions cannot operate
to artificially lengthen the statutorily mandated time for
challenging the Knd use decision. Having rejected
laintifts' claim that their action was timely filed, we
hold
lat the district court correctly dismissed plaintiffs1 action
against South Jordan.

g

n

The district court correctly recognized that cc[t]o allow parties to challenge
ordinances at any time without any time limit would defeat the purposes of the
legislation, CLUDMA, which seeks resolutions of land use issues." R. p. 801.
Any applicant could file for development permission and
when rejected, no matter how improper or faulty the
application, or no matter what weaknesses were in the
sought-for development, claim at any time that the
ordinance was invalid. That would eliminate the appeals
provisions of the legislation and render parts of CIJJDMA
meaningless. No one could ever rely on the ordinance
framework.
Id.
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Foutz, f 25.
Moreover, Gillmor provides no other authority for the proposition that
reliance on and application of an allegedly void land use ordinance constitutes a
continuing violation which would toll the running of the statute of limitations. In
addressing a similar "continuing violation of the constitution55 argument in Mahaffey
v, Forsyth County. 394 S.E.2d 203 (N.C. App. 1990), the court noted, in pertinent
Plaintiffs contend that the 1979 rezoning ccis a
present and ongoing violation of Plaintiffs' due process
and equal protection rights" under the Constitutions of
the
United States and of North Carolina. They allege that
cc
[t]he passing of a statute of limitations should not nave
the legal effect of. . . [making] legal the illegal acts of a
zoning authority." The United States Supreme Court has
rejected this argument in Block y. North Dakota, ex rel
Board of University and School Lands: "A constitutional
claim can become time-barred just as any other claim3 can .
. . . Nothing: in the Constitution requires otherwise/ 461
U.S. 273, 2&2-103 S.Ct. 181L 18^2, 75 L.Ed.2d 840,
857 (198&). (Citations omitted) The North Carolina
Supreme Court has held that plaintiffs may be barred by
their own inaction from asserting violations of
constitutional rights. Tavlor v. City of Raleigh, 290 N.C.
608, 227 S.E.2cT576 (1976). In.that case, plaintiff was
barred by his inactionJrom pursuing his constitutional
claim regarding a zoning ordinance. Plaintiffs in the case
at bar must live with the consequences of their inaction
arising from their failure to challenge the 1979 zoning
amendment during the requisite time period.
394S.R2dat205.
In short, in a decision that presaged this Court's decision in Tolman, the
district court correctly recognized that clear legislative judgments concerning
principles of finality and stability in zoning decisions precluded judicial review of
Gillmor's claims that the 1997 Plan and 1998 Code were facially invalid. Gillmor
could not ignore the public process leading to the adoption of generally applicable
land use and development ordinances, do nothing for years while the County and
other landowners conducted business pursuant to those ordinances, and then seek to
invalidate the ordinances years later after applications concerning her particular
properties are adversely decided based upon the validity of the ordinances. "To hold
otherwise would bring about chaotic conditions beyond all comprehension in the
transfer and usage of real estate in any community having a zoning ordinance
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affecting such land.35 Northville Area Non-Profit Housing Corp. v. Walled Lake,
204 N.W.2d 274, 280 (1972) (rejecting City's attempt to prove its own zoning
ordinance, in effect little more than four years, invalid because of lack of publication
of notice of hearing).
IL

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
COUNTY'S DECISIONS TO DENY GILLMOR'S DEVELOPMENT
APPLICATIONS WERE NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR
ILLEGAL.
Even assuming the Petition for Review portion of Gillmor's action was a bona

fide and timely appeal of the County's decisions to deny Gillmor's applications to
amend the 1997 Plan and 1998 Code to allow her development proposals, the
district court correctly found that the decisions were not arbitrary and capricious:
There is no.dispute that Gillmor's application was
considered in a public meeting and me minutes show that
and plaintiffs have not properly shown that fact is in
dispute. The prior denials of applications were proper
because the applications did not conform to the thenexisting General Plan or Development Code.
Ruling and Order, R. pp. 800-OL
CC

[A] municipality's land use decision is reasonably debatable, and not

otherwise arbitrary or capricious, where it is made to effectuate an objective set out
in the municipality's general plan.33 Tolman v. Logan City, at H 18. As the County's
statement of facts establishes, there is a clear record and Gillmor cannot dispute that
her applications for development approval were inconsistent with the County's then
existing general plan, and thus the County's denial of those applications was not
arbitrary and capricious as a matter of law. Id.
Nevertheless, Gillmor does open her brief by arguing that cc[t]he denial of the
Plat Application was arbitrary and capricious.53 Aplts.3 Br. p. 28. This is so, Gillmor
asserts, because:
[t]he BOA record is nonexistent. Contrary to its statutory
obligations, the BOA did not provide any copy of the
record to the District Court (which Gillmor suspects was
done because the record did not support the decision
made).
I d But this argimient is nonsensical, and contradicted by later portions of Gillmor's
own brief.
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First, Gillmor's argument in this regard is somewhat contradicted by the facts.
As set forth above, the County made transcripts of the BOA proceedings, which in
turn were available to Gillmor's counsel, and those transcripts were both provided to
the district court as part of the summary judgment proceedings and cited by the
parties. See Plaintiffs3 Exhibits, Vol 4, Exs. 126 and 128. See also County's Reply
Memorandum, R. p. 738 (quoting from transcript). In submitting the record, the
County expressly told the district court and Giilmor's counsel:
The County has or will produce for Plaintiffs all of the
documents which it believes constitute the record of
proceedings before the County. The County submits the
portion ofthat record it relies upon herein as a bound
addendum of exhibits to this memorandum, and expects
Plaintiffs will submit any remaining portions of the record
which they deem relevant or material.
R. p. 193.
The second problem with Gillmor's argument, as both the district court
below and the federal district court recognized, is that the Plat Application did not
present either the County staff or the County's BOA with any opportunity to apply
the existing land use ordinances to a specific development approval and thus make a
decision on the application. Instead, Gillmor's approach required County staff and
the BOA to assume or determine that the ordinances were invalid.
But courts have uniformly held that an administrative zoning body lacks
power to declare an ordinance unconstitutional. See e ^ , Roy v. Cleveland Bd. of
Zoning Appeals. 763 N.E.2d 240, 243 (Ohio App, 2001) ("an administrative
agency, such as a board of zoning appeals, cannot determine whether an ordinance is
unconstitutional . . ."); City of Homewood v. Caffee: 400 So. 2d 375, 379 (Ala,
1981). And long-standing Utah law comports with these decisions, Tohnson v.
Utah State Retirement Office. 621 P,2d 1234,1237 (Utah 1980) (stating that
administrative agencies do not determine the constitutionality of legislative
enactments); Clayton v. Bennett, 298 P.2d 531, 533 (Utah 1956) (same).
Faced with a Plat Application which expressly denied the validity of the
County's ordinances, as a legal matter the County's staff and administrative board
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had no choice but to reject the application without actually making any binding
decision as to the application's validity. I d By the same token, a record of any
proceedings before the administrative body with respect to such a decision is
irrelevant.
And Gillmor goes on to expressly recognize this later in her own brief. In
arguing she did not need to "marshal'3 evidence with respect to the County's
decisions, Gillmor states:
[T]he County's requirement that the Applications
be consistent with the 1998 Development Code means
that the County attempted to enforce an illegal code. In
that respect, Gillmor is not seeking review of a body's
"fact-sensitive use of its discretionary powers."
Furthermore, to the extent that Gillmor claims that the
County^ decisions were arbitrary and capricious Gillmor
is not disputingthe nonexistent findings of fact by the
BCC nor the BOA. Accordingly, Gillmor has satisfied her
burden to marshal evidence supporting the BCC's and
BOA's findings.
^
I d at 36 n. 7.
Clearly when Gillmor doesn't and can't dispute any "findings of fact" by the
BOA, and the BOA didn't have authority to determine the underlying legal validity
of the duly enacted zoning ordinances, the County's decisions with respect to the
Plat Application were not "arbitrary and capricious" simply by virtue of any
question about the "record" of the BOA administrative proceedings.
On the contrary, the essential thrust of Gillmor's appeal is her argument that
because the generally applicable 1997 Plan and 1998 Code were illegal and
unenforceable, the County's decisions to deny Plaintiffs' applications to amend the
1997 Plan and 1998 Code as they applied to Gillmor's particular properties, and the
County's decision not to process Gillmor's Plat Application, were themselves
"illegal" under section 17-27-1001. Aplts.' Br. pp. 30-38. But this argument fails
for the reasons set forth above.
Simply put, Gillmor's "illegality" argument fails because at the time of the
County's challenged decisions, Gillmor's assertions that the 1997 Plan and 1998
Code were illegal and unenforceable were entirely unilateral. Whether the 1997 Plan
and 1998 Code were invalid or "illegal" was certainly a disputed issue among the
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participants of the application process on the rezone applications, and invalidity of
the ordinances was not clear to the County's administrative staff when they refused
to process the Plat Application. At the time of the challenged decisions no court had
declared the ordinances invalid Otherwise there would have been no need for
Gillmor's first action in 1998 seeking a courts order to that effect, nor the necessity
to request the court to declare the facial invalidity of 1997 Plan and 1998 Code in
2004 when Gillmor brought this action.
The fundamental flaw in Gillmor's approach, however, is that when Gillmor
finally did proceed to seek review of the ordinances alleged facial "illegality" pursuant
to section 17-27-1001, her claims were barred by the limitations provision in the
very statute by which she sought review. Her unilateral claims of illegality were not
judicially cognizable for reasons of finality and fairness to the County and other
landowners who had worked within the existing ordinance structure for years.
Accordingly, the County's decisions on Gillmor's applications, both the
rezone applications and the Plat Application, must be considered in light of the then
existing standards and ordinances. When so considered, the district court correctly
determined that the County's decisions to deny Gillmor's applications were not in
any way "illegal."
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the County respectfully requests that this Court
affirm the district court's judgment and order in favor of the County on Gillmor's
complaints.
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